Russian gas with an American label? The risks of the Vertical Corridor and Romania's opportunities

The Vertical Gas Corridor originally promised to reduce Central and Eastern Europe's dependence on Russian energy through deliveries coming from the south. But a pipeline does not serve the cause of independence simply because the gas flows through it from a new direction: what also matters is where it originates, who trades it, and under what conditions it reaches buyers. This is the problem explored by Claudia Pîrvoiu in an interview published by HotNews on October 2, 2026, in which Aura Săbăduș, an energy market analyst at the London-based ICIS, discusses the background of American interest, the role of Greek intermediaries, and how Romania could use its own Black Sea gas to strengthen the region's security.

Săbăduș is not opposed to building or using the corridor. On the contrary, she considers it necessary for Romania to be able to source gas from as many directions as possible and to reach several markets itself. The problem begins when, within a system created to expand sources, political connections and intermediary interests come to the fore while the origin of the deliveries remains unclear. Under such circumstances, diversification can even turn into its opposite: new companies and new commercial labels appear, but Russia may still be behind the gas. The interview was prompted by The Wall Street Journal's investigation into the activities of Kimberly Guilfoyle, the United States ambassador to Greece, and into the sale of American liquefied natural gas through intermediaries. The question is directly relevant to Romania too: could Romanian players have come under pressure to buy gas through such an arrangement?

Instead of the inner details of the negotiations, Săbăduș starts from a longer process. After Trump's return, she observed that the American administration showed keen interest in the region stretching from the Baltics through the Adriatic to the Aegean. Over time, however, this attention narrowed increasingly to Southeast Europe, even though expanding energy sources would be important in the other countries of the region as well. Meanwhile, business figures linked to the circle around the president's family appeared in the Balkans. Among them is Gentry Beach, a close associate of Donald Trump Jr. According to the analyst's information, Beach showed interest in gas infrastructure in Bulgaria that received and forwarded Russian shipments toward Central Europe. The involvement of GSP, the company of Romanian businessman Gabriel Comănescu, also came up, particularly in connection with possible repairs to the Nord Stream pipeline. In the course of her investigation into the matter, Săbăduș contacted both businessmen but received no answers to her questions. Beach and Guilfoyle both belong to Donald Trump Jr.'s close circle, but it is not clear to the analyst to what extent their activities are connected. The broader picture, however, is in her view clearly visible: one energy and infrastructure deal after another has emerged in the region, in which representatives of Trump's circle met with regional entrepreneurs. For this reason, the Vertical Corridor cannot be treated as a purely technical project either.

The Athens conference in November 2025 was an important milestone in this process. One of the most active promoters of the corridor became Transgaz and its CEO, Ion Sterian, who worked with the region's network operators to align commercial terms. Săbăduș considers this a substantive achievement: for years it had been difficult to bring the operators of different countries to a common position, even though, alongside technical cooperation, transport tariffs also had to be settled for the corridor to function. This is precisely where the first fundamental contradiction appears. The project can only be useful if it delivers gas to the region at competitive prices, but this cannot be achieved by bypassing European market rules. In the commercial arrangements for the so-called Route 1, Route 2 and Route 3, capacity was initially offered through a separate system, diverging from the European booking calendars. The analyst considers the goal of lowering tariffs and making the route more attractive to be legitimate, but the chosen solution did not fit European requirements on several points. After European intervention, the operators eventually returned to applying European principles.

According to Săbăduș, this is not an isolated problem. ICIS also examined the planned gas pipeline connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia, and conversations with European institutions and analytical bodies revealed similar objections: the arrangement did not properly follow the market principles that the countries involved committed to as part of European integration. Whether this is a deliberate goal or merely the consequence of business deals, she believes it can lead to the same outcome: Southeast Europe gradually drifting away from European rules. She links this danger to the broader direction of American policy as well: the American strategy published in 2025 characterizes its relationship with Europe as adversarial, and she sees Washington as supporting populist movements against the traditional European parties. Read this way, energy cooperation may be about far more than buying and selling gas: political influence can also be built through business relationships.

The decisive question: what kind of gas is arriving?

After the political background, the interview turns to the most tangible question concerning the corridor. If the goal is to reduce dependence on Russia, how can it be ensured that the gas brought in from the south really comes from a different source? The Atlantic S.E.E. company includes, alongside the Greek group Aktor, the state energy company DEPA. According to the interview, DEPA still holds a long-term contract for Russian gas, meaning it is a commercial player that also buys Russian gas. Săbăduș therefore urges that authorities not be satisfied with the commercial designation of shipments but instead check the entire supply chain. The prices raise further questions. The analyst observed a discount of 15–16 euros compared to the Dutch TTF benchmark price on the Greek and Bulgarian markets, and she asks: how can a producer sell so cheaply when bringing gas from such a great distance? These southern shipments also reach Romania, so clarifying their origin is not a secondary matter for Romanian buyers and authorities either. There is no national flag on a molecule of gas; tracing its origin requires reliable documentation and actual verification.

At the Malkoçlar entry point on the Turkish-Bulgarian border, the same problem appears in a different form. Săbăduș speaks here of the connection between the Turkish and Bulgarian networks, which she treats separately from the TurkStream route. According to her, significant volumes of gas still arrive through it, while it remains unclear what the origin of these shipments is and how the Bulgarian authorities verify them. Referring to a ban introduced on June 17 and further restrictions expected in 2027, the interview warns that regulation is only meaningful if it can actually track commercial routes in practice; meanwhile gas also arrives in Bulgaria via TurkStream, from where it can reach further markets in the region. The presence of various sources and intermediaries therefore does not make origin verification unnecessary — it makes it even more important. If the authorities are satisfied with a new company name or a new designation of origin, the Russian supplier can remain within the very system that was created to push it out. The analyst also places the political backdrop of the energy deals in the context of talks between Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff with their Russian counterpart Kirill Dmitriev. She believes the sale of Lukoil's assets in Romania and Bulgaria could also come up in these discussions. Alongside the earlier interest shown by Carlyle, she recalls press reports about a possible purchase by an American businessman linked to the MAGA circle. In the region's energy realignment, gas trade, access to infrastructure and the fate of Russian corporate assets may thus all be interconnected. In examining the relationship between the Greek intermediaries and American diplomacy, the interview also addresses Christos Marafatsos, Aktor's lobbyist. Based on The Wall Street Journal's investigation, the question arose of to what extent Ambassador Guilfoyle's activities served the Greek company's interests. For Săbăduș, the lobbyist's presence at regional meetings alone justifies the question: what role did he play in the talks, and whose interests did American diplomacy represent?

On the Romanian side, she highlights the striking interest shown by former Energy Minister Bogdan Ivan. The Vertical Corridor had already been discussed since roughly 2016, but earlier attempts to involve ministries and Romanian institutions brought little result for a long time. By contrast, interest suddenly picked up in 2025, and at the Athens conference information already emerged about possible contracts for Romanian companies. For a long time, however, it was unclear which company would be the buyer. Some reports named Romgaz, others Nova Power & Gas, and even by the end of the conference uncertainty still surrounded the agreement. In the end, Nova Power & Gas's role was announced. After reading the Wall Street Journal article, Săbăduș interpreted the earlier confusion as a sign that Romgaz may have resisted the purchase, and that negotiations continued until the last moment. From here, the interview turns to another question that is at least as important for Romania: while the country is being drawn into new import arrangements, it may itself gain significant surplus production once Black Sea extraction begins. The two processes should therefore be examined together: what external sources will be needed, how much can the Romanian economy actually use, and where might the gas left over from its own production go?

The Black Sea opportunity and the limits of domestic demand

The planned 2027 launch of Neptun Deep could create a new situation for Romania. According to Săbăduș, the quality of the Black Sea gas is also favorable: recalling a conversation with a geologist, she says the reserves require relatively little processing, which could allow for lower costs and competitive sales. At the same time, the analyst does not consider well-founded the expectation that Romanian consumption will quickly absorb the new production. Against claims of strong demand growth, she goes through the list of potential users one by one. She estimates the Azomureș fertilizer plant's consumption at around one and a half billion cubic meters a year, but also questions what capacity it can operate at after the earlier fire and the necessary repairs. According to ICIS calculations, the Mintia and Iernut power plants could use another two to three billion cubic meters, but their launch has been repeatedly postponed. Expanding the residential gas network is not an immediate solution either. Building new pipelines, connecting localities and actually ramping up consumption all take time, so even as output from the older onshore fields naturally declines, a surplus may remain in the first years of the new production. This gas will have to be sold or stored somewhere.

Hungary, Moldova and Ukraine are all potential markets. However, Săbăduș sees supplying Moldova as a security-policy task that goes beyond mere commercial opportunity. She calls the Romanian-Ukrainian-Moldovan relationship one of Europe's most important security triangles: if Russia were to bring Moldova under its influence, it would gain another foothold for destabilizing Ukraine and would also make Romania's surroundings more unstable. In this situation, Romanian gas can also help keep Moldova on its European path, because predictable supply reduces the scope for external pressure and strengthens cooperation in the region. The significance of Black Sea extraction therefore goes beyond Romania's export revenues: with the right regional policy, it can also strengthen the resilience of neighboring countries.

Another option for managing the surplus is storage in Ukraine. Săbăduș proposes creating a regional strategic reserve from part of Romania's gas, taking advantage of Ukraine's large and flexible underground storage capacity. She considers the fees there more favorable than in Romania, while Romania's own storage facilities offer limited room for placing the growing production. She sees potential in this even given wartime conditions. The reserves lie two to three kilometers deep, and the Ukrainian transport system is extensive, with several alternative routes. If a surface facility is attacked, the flexibility of the network can help reroute the flow elsewhere. The analyst would further reduce financial risks by involving the European Union: she calls for guarantees and reinsurance involvement, which, based on her conversations with London-based insurers, could make it easier to insure reserves stored in Ukraine.

She considers the claim made by AUR that Romania is "giving away its gas to Ukraine" a continuation of the nationalist rhetoric familiar from earlier energy debates. She recalls the opposition to Chevron's shale gas plans, in which political figures and the Orthodox Church also took part. In her view, the question of storage should be judged on the basis of available capacity, fees and supply possibilities: Romania may produce more than it can use or store domestically in the short term, and Ukraine could offer a service for this. Such cooperation, however, also requires upgrading Romania's network. Săbăduș urges the pipeline rehabilitation planned by Transgaz, mentioned in the interview in connection with Mediaș and Tecuci, as well as expanding the possibility of two-way transport. Access to the Ukrainian system would not only help store Romania's surplus but could also open up new supply routes from the north, since gas already reaches Ukraine from several European directions: from Denmark via Poland, as well as from LNG sources in Lithuania, Finland, Poland and Germany. For Romania, this would mean being able to choose among several suppliers, fostering stronger competition and reducing the risk that a single route or a politically influenced arrangement dictates the terms.

The interview's line of argument thus returns to its starting point. The Vertical Corridor can be useful if it truly expands opportunities; and Black Sea production could give Romania a major regional role if the country treats exports, storage and supplying its neighbors as parts of a single strategy. This requires ministries, a regulatory authority and transparently run state companies capable of verifying contracts, tracing the origin of gas, and standing up to political influence. In the end, Săbăduș's warning is simple: energy dependence cannot simply be renamed. If institutions fail to check what goes into the new commercial arrangements, the same actor may remain behind gas painted a different color and sold under a different claimed origin: Gazprom.