Neacșu has received the keys to the government — he will be the capo dei capi

Marian Neacșu has effectively become Romania's prime minister, at least if instead of looking at job titles we look at who the threads leading to the government's operation and financial decisions actually run through. Officially Luca Niculescu still heads the cabinet, but with his own signature he has granted his PSD deputy powers that make Neacșu practically an unavoidable figure across the entire government: he reviews the budget-related draft legislation of fifteen ministries, coordinates the work of ten departments, and has also been given coordinating authority over the institutions of the government apparatus. Meanwhile, he already heads the Interior Ministry, so there he is at home even without any special authorization.

Under Prime Minister's Decision No. 463, published on Wednesday, November 18, Neacșu will now review the budget-related draft legislation of the transport, finance, foreign affairs, justice and defense ministries, as well as of the economy, energy, agriculture and environment ministries. The list is rounded out by the development, EU investment, labor, health, education and culture ministries — meaning that apart from his own Interior Ministry, his review authority extends to every single ministry. The Finance Ministry is no exception either, which illustrates particularly well just how modest a task this is: even the budget-related drafts of the ministry responsible for the state's finances are reviewed by the PSD deputy prime minister. The decision does not state that Neacșu's personal signature will be required for every state account, payment or transfer from now on, nor can the review authority automatically be called an unlimited veto right, but its political significance is nonetheless clear. Any new legislative proposal with budgetary implications must now go through preparation with his involvement, so ministers can no longer simply work out what they want to achieve within their own department. An influential figure has been inserted between the prime minister and the ministries — someone who can weigh in on the financially relevant plans of every sector, and with whom they must therefore reckon even if the area in question is not headed by a PSD minister.

To this is added a "functional coordination" role covering ten ministries, spanning transport, justice, defense, the economy, agriculture, the environment, development, EU investments, labor and health, and also extending to the delegate minister responsible for pre-university education. The finance, foreign affairs, energy, education and culture ministries do not appear on this second list, yet their budget-related drafts likewise go to Neacșu. The cabinet has eighteen ministers in total, sixteen of them heads of ministries and two delegate ministers, so the decision does not entrust the prime minister's deputy with coordinating a narrow policy area, but attaches to him a significant part of the executive branch. The second article also places the coordination of the institutions and organizational units supporting the government's work under Neacșu, while the third requires him to keep the prime minister continuously informed of all this. Niculescu, of course, still retains his prime ministerial powers, but the political picture of this division of labor is quite telling: the deputy coordinates, reviews, oversees the apparatus, and then reports to the man who entrusted him with it all. The prime minister can thus at least be sure that he will be informed of how his own government is running. The weight of the change is best appreciated by comparing it with the previous authorization, since under the regulation of July 2025 Neacșu reviewed the budget-related drafts of only six ministries and handled their political coordination. Now his review extends to fifteen ministries, and the coordination is described in terms of operations rather than politics, while he also holds the leadership of the Interior Ministry in his hands.

Government spokesman Dan Cărbunaru explained all this by saying that in the previous cabinet, the tasks now assigned to a single deputy had been divided among five deputy prime ministers. For the press briefing he even prepared a color-coded comparison showing what had remained of Neacșu's earlier remit and which tasks had arrived from the former portfolios of the other deputies; in his explanation he also referred to the earlier mandates of Barna Tánczos, Oana-Clara Gheorghiu, Cătălin Predoiu, Dragoș Anastasiu and Ionuț Moșteanu, which those involved had partly carried out one after another. The government's position, then, is that the number of deputies has simply decreased, so the sole remaining one has been given more tasks. The administrative part of the explanation is understandable, but it does not resolve the political question, since the whole point is precisely that influence previously divided among several people is now concentrated in a single PSD politician. Marking the tasks with different colored markers on a sheet of paper does not change the fact that they still end up on the same person's desk, and fewer leadership titles does not automatically mean less power. In this case, it rather means that the power is concentrated in fewer hands.

Cărbunaru repeatedly stressed that the final decision still rests with Luca Niculescu, and that Romania's government is led by Romania's prime minister. This is an important statement, although the very fact that the government spokesman has to specifically reassure everyone, after a transfer of powers, that the prime minister is still the prime minister already says a lot about the situation. The right to make the final decision and the influence over the processes that prepare those decisions together shape actual power, and Neacșu has now received a considerable share of the latter. The opposition's reactions attack exactly this shift in power. USR MP Oana Țoiu says that through Neacșu, the PSD is now effectively taking over the leadership of the government in practice as well, since ministers will have to coordinate their priorities and budgetary requests with him. Meanwhile, Liberal MEP Siegfried Mureșan warned that Niculescu has no party of his own to rely on, while the PSD, through Neacșu, is gaining a decisive role in both the government apparatus and the operation of the ministries. In Mureșan's reading, political direction is exercised by Sorin Grindeanu, while Neacșu provides its administrative weight, so in his view the consequence of this authorization is a further weakening of the prime minister.

How far Niculescu will be able to independently wield the prime ministerial power he still holds will become clear in future conflicts, but Wednesday's decision already shows whose position he has reinforced with his own hand. The PSD deputy prime minister simultaneously heads the Interior Ministry, coordinates a large part of the ministries, oversees the government apparatus, and takes part in reviewing the budget-related draft legislation of every other ministry. With such a remit, the word "deputy" mainly helps one find his name on a business card, since within the government's operations Neacșu has become far more than someone who steps in for the boss when needed. Niculescu has thus kept his seat as prime minister, while handing over a large part of the keys to the government's operation to Neacșu, and the spokesman has reassured everyone that the man sitting in the chair is, of course, still the boss. For the ministers, however, what will probably matter most is which door they need to knock on when seeking political backing and budgetary room for their plans — and Wednesday's decision speaks to that far more clearly than the government's reassuring explanation.

Ugar

Did you like this article?

Support our work with a small donation

Secure payment via Stripe • Min. 2 EUR

Gesta recommendations:

They're asking Moscow for permission to defend Ukraine from Moscow

They're asking Moscow for permission to defend Ukraine from Moscow

On Thursday Jared Kushner was still boasting in Berlin that, together with Steve Witkoff, he had managed to get the Russians to accept the idea of NATO-style security guarantees for Ukraine, but on Friday Moscow announced that nothing of the sort was on the table. The most humiliating part of the story is not that Trump's envoys' diplomatic success story didn't even survive a single day, but the…

ugar•
They would encourage the merging of communes with halved taxes and funding worth millions. Here is the first version of the reform

They would encourage the merging of communes with halved taxes and funding worth millions. Here is the first version of the reform

The Romanian government would persuade smaller local authorities to merge with their neighbors by halving residential property and land taxes for five years and offering investment support of at least four million lei. The draft emergency ordinance, put out for public debate on Friday, November 20, primarily targets communes with no more than 1,500 inhabitants, although larger localities could…

ugar•
Joint primary against the extremes: Attal, Retailleau and Lisnard would field a single candidate against Le Pen and Mélenchon

Joint primary against the extremes: Attal, Retailleau and Lisnard would field a single candidate against Le Pen and Mélenchon

In France, three presidential candidates of the centre and the centre-right have agreed in principle to decide in a joint primary which of them will be the sole candidate in the 2027 presidential election.

ugar•
A Reply to Anna Karczag: No, This Was Not Yalta 2.0!

A Reply to Anna Karczag: No, This Was Not Yalta 2.0!

Let me state at the outset: I enjoy reading Anna Karczag's articles, especially when she puts in the effort and does the necessary research. The piece on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion is a thorough, information-rich example of that, as are several of her articles on cognitive warfare — all praiseworthy work. Yet there are times when she overdoes it and lets emotion take over — and that is…

ugar•
Relax, this isn't Yalta 2.0, because Putin doesn't have a mustache

Relax, this isn't Yalta 2.0, because Putin doesn't have a mustache

I've been reading the reports on the Shenzhen summit of the Big Three, and the analyses too: a multitude of Hungarian analysts raised in the Western cultural sphere are talking and writing about how, oh no, this wasn't Yalta 2.0 at all. But it was! I'm sorry that I have to be the one to switch on the light in the increasingly darkening skulls of these trendy analysts, but yes, this was Yalta 2.0.

ugar•