The West did business, Putin prepared for war – why did the deterrence of Russia fail?
For decades the West believed that trade would tame Russia, that an increasingly prosperous society would sooner or later demand freedom, and that a Kremlin integrated into the world economy would not risk everything it had gained from peaceful cooperation by going to war. According to Russian-American writer Elvira Bary, this idea failed where Western leaders confused Russia's economic interests with Putin's interest in retaining power, and recognized too late that the two could even work against each other.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe bought Russian energy, Western companies invested in Russia, and Russians increasingly traveled, studied and shopped abroad, while the deepening of ties seemed to promise lasting peace. It may have seemed that another European war would simply become pointless, since every party would have too much to lose, yet the war against Georgia came, then the annexation of Crimea, the aggression in Donbas, and finally the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Bary, who grew up in the Soviet Union, examines in her video How We Failed: Why the West Couldn't Stop Putin in Ukraine what Western decision-makers failed to understand about the system they were doing business with, and how Putin's calculations could have been changed even before the invasion. She naturally places responsibility for the war on the Russian leader, since it was he who decided to attack, but she measures the effectiveness of deterrence by the costs and consequences he had to reckon with at the moment of that decision.
Bary does not consider the cooperation policy of the 1990s foolish from the outset, since it had a reasonable basis both economically and politically. According to the Western idea, rising living standards would strengthen the middle class, which would in time demand more honest institutions, greater political say and more predictable governance, and a more democratic Russia would also be less of a threat to its neighbors. Trade thus promised business profit and long-term security at the same time, while Europe's energy needs and Russia's reserves made the partnership an obvious choice. Russian oil and gas also promised cheaper energy, more competition among suppliers, and less dependence on the volatile Middle East, but the author notes that the deal had another, less often mentioned appeal. It often seemed more convenient to strike a deal with a centralized Russian state than to invest in a democracy where one had to reckon with independent institutions, local interests, social protests and public debate; once the Kremlin gave its approval, the state could clear away any further obstacles, which companies could easily mistake for efficiency.
Far less attention was paid to what kind of state the money paid for energy would ultimately build once it arrived in Russia. According to Bary, Putin used these revenues to strengthen the army, the security services, the state media, and a system built on personal dependencies, in which wealth, advancement and political influence increasingly depended on loyalty to him. In the 2000s, this arrangement seemed acceptable to many, because after the crisis of the 1990s wages rose, living standards improved, and millions of people felt they were finally living in more orderly conditions. However, rising prosperity also brought demands to the surface that Putin no longer wished to satisfy, because part of the urban, better-educated and wealthier population was not content with better consumption opportunities and also began demanding political rights. Bary recalls as a turning point the protests that unfolded after the 2011 parliamentary elections, when tens of thousands took to the streets over allegations of fraud, a significant part of them from the very middle class whose growth had previously been presented as a success of the system. At the same time, the economy's momentum was also weakening, so the promise of prosperity, which had been one of the pillars of Putin's popularity until then, worked less and less. In such a situation, the development of the economy would have required more competition, competent officials, independent institutions and people willing to honestly point out mistakes, but personal rule is hard to reconcile with precisely these things. The longer Putin ruled, the more important loyalty became, and the elite around him tied the security of their own wealth and influence to the existing order as well. When growing prosperity no longer provided sufficient political legitimacy, external conflict became a more useful tool, because military success could be sold as national glory, difficulties could be blamed on external enemies, and society could be mobilized around the leader. According to Bary, this is the point at which the Western calculation backfired, because trade had enriched a state whose domestic political interest now lay in confrontation. Western leaders weighed how much Russia would lose in a war, while Putin also weighed how much he himself could gain from a conflict if it strengthened his power, silenced his opponents and gave his system new legitimacy. What is a loss for the country can still be a political investment for a dictator, and this difference cannot be understood from trade balances alone.
The next major question in the analysis is the nuclear threat, whose effect Bary approaches through the lens of Cold War fears. Western societies lived for generations with the possibility of nuclear annihilation, with shelters, school drills and the image of a civilization destroyed within minutes, while knowing almost nothing about the inner workings of the Soviet system. According to her, this also created an image of the enemy in which Russia appeared not simply as a dangerous power but as an almost unfathomable actor, one to which even the usual logic of self-preservation might not apply. Putin exploited this fear when, from the very start of the invasion, Russian nuclear weapons were repeatedly brought up, and the Kremlin suggested that the next weapon or aid package given to Ukraine could already lead to a third world war. According to Bary, the weight of the threat naturally has to be weighed, but it is equally important to examine the people making it, because the Russian elite spent decades building wealth, family security, social status and power, all of which a nuclear war could destroy. This does not mean that the use of a nuclear weapon is impossible, but it does mean that the Kremlin's decisions are also influenced by interests that work against escalation. The author recalls that Moscow has called numerous weapons shipments, the strikes on Crimea and other Western steps dangerous crossings of red lines, yet several of these red lines were later crossed without the threatened nuclear response materializing. This alone does not prove that every threat is a bluff, but it shows that the political purpose of the threats also needs to be examined, especially when they consistently lead to a delay in aid.
Bary's main objection is that fear has often taken the place of understanding, and that the West began limiting itself even when Moscow had merely gestured toward its most severe option. If the adversary's interests, dependencies and decision-making constraints are pushed into the background, deterrence becomes one-sided, because the Kremlin can learn that it only has to reiterate the threat for the other side to rein in its own response. Bary sees a similar misunderstanding in the recurring idea that an aggressor can eventually be satisfied with a sufficient concession. Western debates repeatedly bring up avoiding loss of face, offering a result that can be presented as a victory to the domestic audience, or proposing a favorable deal, yet for the leader of a system built on personal authority, simply getting something is not necessarily the most important thing. He also has to prove to his own people that he is capable of getting what he wants, rewarding obedience and punishing resistance. The author illustrates this with the example of a gang leader who confidently walks into a bank with his men, only for it to turn out that his gun doesn't work, and the bank clerk beats him up and throws him out. If the city's leaders then offer him a small business so he can have an honest income and give up robbery, he will probably accept the money, but he will not feel his own problem is solved, because his followers saw him humiliated. He may therefore try to restore his authority through renewed violence, meaning the economic concession does not necessarily produce the political outcome the conceding party hopes for. Success can teach the aggressor an equally dangerous lesson, because if the attack brings territory, a better bargaining position or further concessions, the lesson learned is that violence pays off. Bary therefore considers it necessary to have a deterrence that attaches clear and consistent consequences to aggression, so that a new attempt does not seem more attractive than the previous one. If instead every crisis ends with a reward for whoever started it, negotiation easily turns into collecting the profits of violence.
She speaks about sanctions in a far more nuanced way than is usual in political debates about their effectiveness, acknowledging the restriction of technological access, the reduction of revenues and the increased cost of the war, while also pointing out unintended consequences. In her view, some measures can push back into dependence on the Russian system people who would otherwise be moving away from it, and this can affect wealthy figures tied to power just as much as ordinary Russians fleeing the war or the dictatorship. Someone trying to live abroad can face visa, residency, banking or employment obstacles, while the Kremlin tells them that the West hates them anyway, so it's better for them to go home. According to Bary, one doesn't even need to become a supporter of Putin to return, because the narrowing of one's life situation alone can force one back home, and the Russian state thereby gets back that person's work, knowledge and taxes. A similar question arises for the businessperson who is genuinely ready to break with the system and move their money out of Russia but cannot find a workable way out. The author would therefore consider it advisable to pursue a sanctions policy that makes loyalty to the Kremlin more costly while still allowing for genuine separation from it. The departure of an engineer, scientist, programmer or entrepreneur can drain a resource from the system, as can the withdrawal of capital, so she believes restrictions are also worth weighing on the basis of whether, in practice, they weaken the resources available to Putin or instead lock in place the very people who would otherwise leave.
Bary also considers the communication of Western governments inadequate, because the announcement of new aid packages was not accompanied by a sufficiently consistent explanation of why they serve the security of their own societies. For someone struggling with their mortgage, food prices or their children's future, the next ten-billion package can easily look like money disappearing somewhere far away, in someone else's war, if no one clearly explains what the consequences of the aggressor's victory would be. If a stronger state can successfully seize the territory of a weaker neighbor, other leaders learn from that, just as they learn from a conquest that fails and turns out to be unacceptably costly. In this argument, supporting Ukraine also serves to prevent future wars, because it shapes the international experience of what can be seized by force. According to Bary, this exact connection — between today's spending and the security of future generations — should have been shown much more clearly.
Nor should the moral argument be shyly hidden behind budget figures, because helping the party under attack also follows from the values Western societies profess to hold. In the author's example, if a gang beats up a smaller child on the street, helping would be the natural response, and it would be rather twisted to explain away what happened by saying the victim should have been stronger. In Ukraine's case too, we are deciding whether to accept that the more powerful party can take whatever it is able to seize, or whether we consider the protection of rules and of the weaker party to be our own responsibility as well.
The analysis finally returns to military preparedness, because according to Bary the West's economic and technological superiority long obscured just how much its actual defense capabilities had been neglected. Many European governments assumed that Putin would not destroy the cooperation that also brought significant benefits to Russia, while the Kremlin was building up war capabilities that could also be used for political purposes. An economically irrational war can still serve the survival of the leader in a system of personal rule. Deterrence can work if the aggressor already expects convincing military resistance before the attack, rather than expecting empty warehouses, uncertain governments and production that can only be ramped up over years on the other side. According to Bary, the point of preparedness is precisely to make war a bad choice from the outset, because someone facing an immediately deployable force makes a very different decision than someone who can count on long political debates and slowly arriving aid. All of this naturally costs money, but the author reminds us that effective deterrence is cheaper than rebuilding destroyed cities, caring for millions of refugees, and converting the economy to a war footing. In the postwar reconstruction of Western Europe, prosperity and security were still closely linked, so economic support, political cooperation and the building of lasting defense institutions advanced together. In this view, security is one of the preconditions for trade, investment and everyday life to remain predictable.
Bary's final conclusion is that there will always be systems in which violence looks like a shortcut to wealth, authority or holding onto power, and therefore peaceful societies cannot afford to permanently give up the ability to defend themselves. She compares this to the functioning of an immune system, which must not be built only once an attack has already taken hold, and she asks viewers to recall a decision of their own in which they noticed a warning sign yet brushed it aside because it was more comfortable to believe a more reassuring explanation. At the end of the video, she turns away from strategic questions and back to those who bear the consequences in their own lives, presenting the Meds for Ukraine initiative, which helps disabled, severely ill and other vulnerable Ukrainian civilians buy medicine. According to her, the program, linked to the international online music community Tamza Song Club, is run by volunteers, no operating costs are deducted from donations, and helpers in Ukraine assess needs and verify how the funds are used. For behind the mistakes of great powers stand people who, alongside the war, also have to figure out whether they will get their next dose of medicine.
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