From fear to the ballot box: how the Kremlin's influence system in Latvia works

Václav Malík, Anton Mikhalchuk and Egor Kuroptev, researchers at the European Commission's Strategic Communications Center, did not simply collect a handful of Russian disinformation stories spread ahead of the Latvian election, but tried to uncover the structure of a lasting influence ecosystem in which state institutions, financing channels, intelligence officers, local politicians, actors posing as human-rights defenders or researchers, security companies, Telegram channels and social-media influencers complement each other's work. According to the central claim of their study, the Kremlin's most powerful tool in its operation against Latvia is fear of war:

The danger, then, is not invented — but according to the authors, the promise that a political shift toward Moscow would eliminate it is deceptive.

From a real threat to electoral blackmail

The report places Latvia's October 3 parliamentary election in the context of Russian hybrid operations under way across Europe. The authors recall the attempted explosive-drone attack on Leipzig/Halle Airport in August, which Germany attributed to Russia; the arson attacks, explosions and drone incursions seen in Poland; and the brief Russian helicopter airspace violation detected on September 23. Added to this was the Russian foreign ministry's open threats: on September 1, Maria Zakharova spoke of a "firm and crushing" response should what she called military escalation continue in the Baltic region. Through this, Russian communication reverses the relationship between cause and effect: it portrays not Moscow's aggression but the Baltic states' self-defense measures and NATO ties as the source of tension. The method was demonstrated with particular clarity by the dual messaging of September 25. On that day, Putin again spoke of the alleged deprivation of rights suffered by the Baltic states' Russian-speaking population, describing Russia's actions as humanitarian and legal in nature. On the very same day, RIA Novosti published an article by Alexander Nosovich, editor-in-chief of the Kremlin-friendly RuBaltic.ru, envisioning a "very brief" new special military operation and nuclear strikes against Lithuania. The Russian state news agency removed and disavowed the article within hours, but according to the report's authors, the two messages together precisely illustrate the essence of the pressure campaign: on one channel Moscow presents itself as the peaceful defender of a persecuted minority, while on another it floats the possibility of military annihilation.

It is this real fear that the pro-Russian information network translates into local politics. Aleksejs Rosļikovs, former leader of For Stability!, warned of war and forced mobilization should the Latvian government's policy fail to change, while the pro-war Telegram network InfoDefense backed the Sovereign Power–Latvian Union of Young Latvians. These seemingly different political offers were built on the same underlying premise: that Latvia can supposedly buy itself security by scaling back support for Ukraine, questioning defense spending, and resisting Moscow less firmly. According to Malík and his co-authors, the strategic consequence would be precisely the opposite, since such a concession would prove to the Kremlin that the threat can be converted into election results and political influence.

The Russian-speaking population is not a uniform political bloc

The authors stress that it would be a mistake to treat Latvia's Russian-speaking population as a uniform, inherently pro-Moscow community. In a 2023 nationwide survey, 35.7 percent of respondents named Russian as their native language, and 36.2 percent said they used it as the language of family communication — but these figures denote linguistic, not political or citizenship, categories. Among Russian speakers are Latvian citizens, holders of the special "non-citizen" status, and foreign nationals alike. It is precisely this diversity that Russian propaganda tries to erase when it constructs a persecuted community speaking in the name of all Russian speakers. The economically struggling Latgale region, which borders Russia and Belarus, offers particularly fertile ground for such manipulation, but the operation is not confined to that region. A local language-policy dispute or citizenship case can first become a story in the Russian-language media, then a report republished in other countries, and finally a diplomatic complaint or an international legal accusation. According to the authors, each stage lends new authority to the same claim: a local grievance becomes a foreign news story, which in turn becomes a "documented case" that Russian diplomats and lawyers can then cite. After Latvia restricted the operation of Russian state media and took action against sanctions violators, the propaganda did not disappear but adapted. Media broadcasting directly from Moscow were partly replaced by local politicians, professional organizations, groups posing as human-rights defenders, and personal brands.

Citing research by The Insider, the report names Vladimir Balobayev as the official responsible for Baltic affairs within the Russian presidential administration, while identifying Igor Sorokopud, first secretary at the Russian embassy, as head of the SVR's Riga station. The areas of interest attributed to him include Latvia's cooperation with NATO, its assistance to Ukraine, and access to decision-makers. The authors, however, carefully separate the institutional background they uncovered from individual instances of election interference, assessing the latter primarily on the basis of the actual content that appeared on the channels.

Pravfond sustains not just individual articles but an entire infrastructure

One important funder of the network is Pravfond, founded by the Russian foreign ministry and Rossotrudnichestvo to protect the rights of "compatriots" living abroad. Officially it provides legal assistance to Russian communities outside Russia, but according to its internal correspondence, it also sustains, through grants and legal fees, individuals, organizations and media projects that spread narratives serving the Russian state's interests. The European Union placed the foundation on its sanctions list in June 2023, yet the OCCRP later documented further payments to recipients within the EU. A 2026 Russian government draft plan described by the EU Stratcom outlines a possible way around this: trusted Russian citizens open domestic bank accounts and receive into them money actually intended for foreign partners. Direct transfers can thus be hindered by sanctions, while the link between the funder and the recipient remains intact. The study illustrates this system with several examples. Historian Valerij Engel, who lives in Latvia, has spoken for years of an alleged resurgence of fascism in the country; Re:Baltica uncovered a 2024 grant application requesting 41,000 euros for research on "Russophobia" in Europe and Ukraine, with presentations planned in Warsaw, Geneva and Moscow. Engel denied having submitted the application or having received money after 2022, but journalists linked the document to his contact details and other supporting data. In February 2026 Latvia's state security service requested that he be barred from entering the country, citing his role in Russian non-military influence operations.

In the local legal infrastructure, the work of lawyer Elizabete Krivcova links the Non-Citizens' Congress, which advocates for the rights of "non-citizens," to lawsuits concerning Russian-language education, residency rights and citizenship, as well as to earlier Pravfond grants. The authors also note that the association called Conscentia was renamed Immigration Assistant in 2023, while its registration number remained unchanged. This matters because the organization's continuity would not be recognizable from a search based solely on the new name. In the report's interpretation, the key function of such a legal environment is to turn individual cases into formal complaints and internationally interpretable human-rights claims. Pro-Kremlin activist Aleksandrs Gaponenko, co-founder of the Non-Citizens' Congress and head of the Institute of European Studies, which also receives funding from the Russian state-backed Russkiy Mir, has linked this older infrastructure to the current election mobilization. In January 2026 a Latvian court sentenced him to ten years in prison for supporting a foreign state's activities against Latvia and inciting national hatred; his lawyer has filed an appeal against the ruling. Texts attributed to him nonetheless kept circulating in September, simultaneously feeding the "persecuted Russians" narrative and backing certain election contenders. The system can thus turn even a criminal case into fresh propaganda material: the defendant becomes a "political prisoner," and state action against him becomes further proof of persecution.

The best-documented link between financing and media distribution is the figure of Aleksejs Stefanovs. According to Re:Baltica, 109,000 euros were earmarked for a Baltic Telegram project whose grant application named Stefanovs as editor-in-chief. The network included Baltic Bridge, Shadows of the Baltics, The Bear of Happiness, For Lithuania's Sake! and Old Thomas's Herald; the project also distributed videos made by Sputnik contributor Viktoria Fyodorova under the pseudonym Sipsikova. The channels deliberately blended Russian-language propaganda with national cultural references, so that the content did not always look like a message coming from abroad but like a local Latvian, Lithuanian or Estonian voice. In June 2026 Pravfond opened a branch at Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad, creating yet another institutional base close to the Baltic information space. According to the report, Kaliningrad has long served as a recruiting ground for the Kremlin's Baltic apparatus: Balobayev previously headed the Russian Baltic center operating there, and his predecessor, Vadim Smirnov, likewise built his career in Kaliningrad before taking over the Baltic department of the presidential administration. These institutions thus do not merely fund individual propaganda publications; they sustain the people, the professional infrastructure and the channels through which the same accusations can repeatedly return to public attention.

From propaganda to an international legal weapon

Another branch of the influence system operating in Latvia is Russian "lawfare" — the use of law as a political and informational weapon. Since 2022 Russia has sent a series of diplomatic notes to the three Baltic states; according to the data uncovered, Latvia and Lithuania each received five such notes, and Estonia four. These combine education-policy decisions, statements by politicians, and disputes over historical memory into a single, systemic indictment alleging racial or ethnic discrimination. In May 2026 Zakharova already said that the preliminary procedure was nearing its end and that the case could reach the International Court of Justice in The Hague before the end of the year. The law firm Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov and Partners, which previously represented Russia in proceedings against Ukraine, is involved in the legal preparations. According to correspondence obtained by Re:Baltica, Delfi and LRT, lawyer Anastasia Taranova requested historical materials from Vladimir Simindei, research director of the Kremlin-backed Historical Memory Foundation, as well as from Nikolai Mezhevich, chairman of the Russian Baltic Studies Association. Their task was to gather materials on Russian communities, language use and education. This shows a direct link between the legal team and the producers of Russian historical narratives.

The planned proceedings could be based on Article 22 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which allows recourse to the court in The Hague in certain interstate disputes not settled through negotiation or the convention's own procedures. The authors, however, note an important limitation: the individual lawsuits in Latvia, the cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights, and the interstate proceedings planned by Russia are not legally identical, and public evidence does not yet confirm that the Latvian organizations named in the report directly handed over materials to the Russian legal team. Yet a favorable court ruling is not even necessary for political gain. The mere filing of the case can generate official responses, negotiations and years of media coverage, while Moscow can present the mere existence of the proceedings as though a respected international forum had already found the accusations against the Baltic states to be well-founded. The claims circulating in election propaganda can thus gain new life and apparent legal credibility through the judicial process, long before the court itself even addresses them on the merits.

The network backs a party, but keeps several irons in the fire

On September 2, InfoDefense republished Gaponenko's call to support the Sovereign Power–Union of Young Latvians, led by Jūlija Stepaņenko, then added its own commentary accusing the For Stability! party of taking votes away from the alliance and claiming that Latvian security services were protecting it for precisely that reason. This was no longer mere grievance-based messaging but direct steering of voters. At the same time, the rivalry between the two pro-Russian political forces suggests that there is not necessarily complete unity even within the Kremlin-linked milieu: the Russian presidential administration and various security services can run parallel operations abroad with different budgets and priorities, which at times support different parties. The report describes InfoDefense as a multilingual, pro-Kremlin propaganda network founded at the initiative of military blogger Yuri Podolyaka. Earlier investigations reported on Podolyaka's ties to the GRU and FSB, though the authors note that this alone does not prove that specific content concerning the Latvian election was published on the orders of either service. In any case, two separate paths emerge in the election strategy: the more openly pro-Moscow For Stability!, and the less openly positioned but more popular Sovereign Power–Union of Young Latvians. In a September poll, the latter stood in second place with 9.4 percent, while For Stability! received 2.8 percent.

According to the study, Stepaņenko's family finances point to a tangible Russian connection but do not prove direct Kremlin funding of the party. Her father, Sergei Fedotov, is the majority owner of two companies near Moscow; Forma ZhBI supplied concrete elements, including tank obstacles and stoves, to Russian forces, including in occupied Donbas. Stepaņenko's asset declarations listed gifts from her father totaling 419,598 euros: cash in 2022 and an apartment in Riga in 2024. The authors describe this as documented family funding from a businessman whose company supported the Russian war effort, while explicitly noting that this is not the same as a proven payment from the Kremlin. The older activist network of the Latvian Russian Union also appears within the alliance. Anna Bondere, a former associate of ex-MEP Tatjana Ždanoka, took part in campaigns to defend Russian-language schools and in "compatriot" organizations. According to the authors, her significance lies primarily in personal continuity: people linked to earlier Russian influence networks can also be deployed within new party alliances, even when the name, leadership or public image of the old formation has changed.

A 2025 report by Latvia's state security service named For Stability!, Sovereign Power and the Latvian Russian Union as the political forces most strongly encouraging the separation of the Russian-speaking social group, regularly spreading narratives that aligned with Russian interests. The network is capable of exploiting any election outcome. If the party it supports does well, it gains political influence; if it loses, or if other parties refuse to form a coalition with it, the result can be presented as proof of the deliberate exclusion of the Russian-speaking population. Even the redistribution of parliamentary seats among constituencies can be exploited: in 2026, based on the number of registered voters, Latgale received one fewer seat while Riga received two more, since Latvian citizens living abroad are counted as belonging to the capital. Propaganda can thus turn this demographic calculation into an ethnic accusation about the silencing of Russian-speaking voters.

One claim, many seemingly independent channels

One of the most important parts of the study shows how the network creates the appearance of many independent sources. A September text attributed to Gaponenko claimed that the number of "political prisoners" in the Baltic states had exceeded three hundred, calling the region "BALTGULAG." The EU Stratcom traced how the same piece traveled from the Prison Bulletin channel through Latvian Hillock to Baltic Bridge, Shadows of the Baltics, Baltic AntiFascists and Pravda LV. Readers could encounter the claim across several different media outlets, yet in reality all of them originated from the same recurring producer. Stefanovs played a similar role, with his interviews and commentary republished on pages with different names targeting different audiences. The network often uses real scandals as raw material: when Welfare Minister Reinis Uzulnieks was caught driving with a blood alcohol level reported at 0.309 per mille, the incident and the minister's dismissal were expanded into a story about the lack of credibility of the entire governing elite.

Multilingualism does not change the political direction of the message, only adjusts its packaging for different audiences. InfoDefense's Latvian- and Estonian-language channels published coordinated attacks on two Latvian nationalist candidates, using one of their service in the Ukrainian military to portray them as a physical threat to the Russian-speaking population. A Lithuanian-language Pravda post directed readers to a full Russian-language Baltnews article about Latvian defense spending. The high point came on September 11 with a post by Shadows of the Baltics, which turned a radio interview into a forecast of "genocide or war," transforming a media dispute into a threat of physical annihilation.

The channels do not all have the same function. Sputnik and Baltnews produce Russian state media content, the Pravda network republishes it in several languages, InfoDefense creates localized versions and runs direct election propaganda, Baltic Bridge and Shadows of the Baltics are part of the documented-support project, and other Telegram channels provide further distribution. TikTok reaches a wider audience: according to EEAS StratCom data from August 2026, former MP Glorija Grevcova had about 174,000 followers, former diplomat and Young Latvians party politician Rūdolfs Bremanis had 110,000, and Aivars Smans had 49,000. The authors note that these are account-level follower counts, not proof of actual reach. The significance of the smaller Telegram channels lies not necessarily in the size of their own audience but in the fact that they preserve content for a long time and keep it available for redistribution. This means that at election time an already existing network can be mobilized instead of building new infrastructure every time.

When the propaganda network meets the intelligence environment

The report draws a distinction between the spread of propaganda and documented intelligence activity, but points to personal overlaps between the two spheres. In July 2026 the Latvian State Security Service initiated criminal proceedings against four Latvian citizens suspected of passing information to the FSB and other Russian institutions through the Kremlin-friendly Baltic AntiFascists network. One of the suspects allegedly used his job as a security guard to obtain surveillance camera footage and identifying data on people and organizations supporting Ukraine. According to the research, Roman Samul links this sphere to the information network: his name appeared in Baltic AntiFascists cases, while he ran Telegram and TikTok accounts from Belarus targeted at Latvia. Pravfond funding has also surfaced around the legal defense of the related defendants.

The private security sector receives special attention because its employees have access to buildings, surveillance systems, personal data and sensitive infrastructure. Rosļikovs's business past is linked to several security companies, including ORDO Security, and other figures from the For Stability! party are also present in the sector. The actual owner of Baltijas Leģions, Irina Buša, is the party's candidate; her husband is a member of the company's board, and employees with other party affiliations are also found among its staff. In 2020 the company was contracted to maintain access-control, alarm and surveillance systems at the premises of the Central Finance and Contracting Agency, including offices operating inside the Finance Ministry building. The authors treat this as evidence of past state-level access, not as evidence of espionage. According to EEAS StratCom, since 2025 Apsardze ROR has been guarding an entrance to the Riga Free Port that is also used by NATO shipments, and some of its staff come from the KDR Group. The latter's owner, Kirils Haritonovs, ran on the same electoral list as Rosļikovs in 2020.

Another, historical chain of business ties leads from ORDO Security through ORDO Group and Nataļja Rudzīte's former real estate business to Kirill Kovalchuk, chairman of Russia's National Media Group. Kovalchuk is the nephew of Yuri Kovalchuk, a long-standing confidant of Putin, and has been under US sanctions since 2016. Here, too, the report explicitly urges caution: this is a historical chain of business links that illuminates the environment but does not in itself prove current coordination. The border, energy prices and an ammunition factory are all raw material for propaganda. Latvia's eastern border continually produces real events that an influence operation can be built upon. On 16 July 2026, Latvian authorities registered 111 attempted irregular border crossings from Belarus, while on Lithuania's longer Belarusian border there were only two. According to reports, migrants were transported to potential crossing points from the Belarusian side. Proving the information impact of the operation does not require showing that the same center directs both the border pressure and every channel reporting on it: Minsk creates or intensifies the disruption, and pro-Russian media use it to portray the Latvian government as helpless and to pit the costs of border defense against household spending.

A similar preparatory narrative is being built around drone incidents. On 7 May, drones coming from Russia entered Latvian airspace, and a strike on an oil storage facility in Rēzekne damaged four empty tanks. According to the Latvian authorities, the drones were probably related to Ukrainian operations against targets inside Russia. Pro-Russian channels targeting Latvia then began claiming that drones bearing Ukrainian markings were already being launched from the territory of the Baltic states. In the authors' interpretation, the purpose is to pre-emptively assign responsibility to Latvia: if Russia later carries out an attack, it could then be presented not as aggression but as alleged retaliation.

The report also reveals a more cautiously framed, potential point of contact between legal activism and the illegal border-area economy. Krivcova's law firm operates at the same Riga address as the law office representing Elmārs Laizāns's companies; the businessman's circle has been linked to Latvia's illegal cigarette industry. The authors do not claim that this in itself proves cooperation or a crime, but argue that geographic and professional proximity could in principle create access to actors familiar with smuggling routes, intermediaries and cross-border logistics. Economic propaganda likewise picks out real problems and then interprets them as the inevitable punishment for NATO membership, aid to Ukraine and the break with Russia. A planned ammunition factory near Jēkabpils, worth up to €200 million, could create around two hundred jobs, yet Sputnik presented it as part of the "circulatory system of war," linking local safety and environmental concerns to a broader war narrative. Shadows of the Baltics framed the 20–30 percent rise in Riga heating prices expected in December as a consequence of rejecting Russian gas, even though Latvia's Ministry of Economics attributed it to a general rise in the price of gas and wood chips. Meanwhile, Argumenty i Fakty predicted "mass bankruptcies" because of the sanctions against Russia.

According to EEAS StratCom, undermining investor confidence may be a secondary but real goal: portraying Latvia as a country that is steadily impoverishing, on the brink of war and ungovernable could raise its financing costs and discourage investors. However, the report also presents counter-evidence: the stock of foreign direct investment stood at €27.8 billion at the end of June 2026, and in 2025 the Latvian investment agency supported the launch of 31 projects worth a total of €1.01 billion. The goal of the propaganda, then, is not simply to falsify reality but to selectively rearrange it: existing difficulties are all made to lead to the same conclusion, namely that resisting Russia is dangerous, costly and hopeless.

The report's conclusion

The key finding of the analysis by Malík, Mikhalchuk and Kuroptev is that Latvia is not home to isolated, unconnected propaganda channels but to a durable and adaptive infrastructure in which funding, content production, translation, republishing, political representation, legal advocacy and, in some cases, the intelligence environment can intersect. The authors consistently distinguish between proven financial support, observed content coordination, historical business ties and presumed operational cooperation; they do not claim that every actor is directed by the same center, or that every uncovered connection in itself proves illegal activity. The strength of the system stems precisely from the fact that it does not always need a unified chain of command. Kremlin-linked institutions sustain the actors and platforms, state media produce the core narratives, local politicians and influencers translate them into the language of everyday grievances, Telegram and the Pravda network multiply the apparent sources, and lawyers cast the complaints into diplomatic or international-legal form. The operation's central political offer is the same at every level: Russia itself creates the uncertainty, then offers concessions to Russia as the remedy for that uncertainty.

According to the report, Latvian voters cannot decide whether Moscow will continue its escalation in Europe, but they can decide whether threats are politically rewarded. If parties backed by or aligned with the Kremlin's interests advance, the network gains direct influence; if they suffer defeat, the result can be used as new proof of the alleged suppression of the Russian-speaking population. The election result therefore does not close the operation but merely moves it into a new phase.

Source: A detailed Hungarian-language summary of the report by Václav Malík, Anton Mikhalchuk and Egor Kuroptev, researchers at the EEAS Strategic Communications Centre, titled Latvia's Kremlin-Linked Influence Ecosystem. The original study, in English, can be read in full here. Translated and edited by: Anna Karczag/Ugar